Case Law: Pioneer Town Planners Pvt. Ltd vs. DCIT (ITAT Delhi)

S.147/ 151: (i) Sanction granted by writing “Yes, I am satisfied” is not sufficient to comply with the requirement of s. 151 because it means that the approving authority has recorded satisfaction in a mechanical manner and without application of mind, (ii) If information is received from investigation wing that assessee was beneficiary of accommodation entries but no further inquiry was undertaken by AO, said information cannot be said to be tangible material per se and, thus, reassessment on said basis is not justified (All imp judgements referred)

This shows that the AO proceeded to initiate reassessment proceedings on the basis of borrowed satisfaction without any application of mind and exercise on the information received from the Investigation Wing of the Department. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the AO proceeded to initiate reassessment proceedings u/s. 147 of the Act and to issue notice u/s. 148 of the Act on the basis of borrowed satisfaction and without any application of mind and examination of the so called material and information received from the investigation wing to establish any nexus, even prima facie, with the such information  Read the rest of this entry »

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Case Law: Torrent Pharmaceuticals Ltd vs. DCIT (ITAT Ahmedabad)

S.263 Revision: Even after the insertion of Explanation 2, the CIT has to show that the view of the AO is wholly unsustainable in law. It is only in a very gross case of inadequacy in inquiry or where inquiry is per se mandated on the basis of record available before the AO and such inquiry was not conducted, the revisional power so conferred can be exercised to invalidate the action of AO. Otherwise, every order of the AO would become susceptible to S. 263 and, in turn, will cause serious unintended hardship to the tax payer concerned for no fault on his part

The Revisional Commissioner is expected show that the view taken by the AO is wholly unsustainable in law before embarking upon exercise of revisionary powers. The revisional powers cannot be exercised for directing a fuller inquiry to merely find out if the earlier view taken is erroneous particularly when a view was already taken after inquiry. If such course of action as interpreted by the Revisional Commissioner in the light of the Explanation 2 is permitted, Revisional Commissioner can possibly find fault with each and every assessment order without himself making any inquiry or verification and without establishing that assessment order is not sustainable in law. This would inevitably mean that every order of the lower authority would thus become susceptible to Section 263 of the Act and, in turn, will cause serious unintended hardship to the tax payer concerned for no fault on his part. Apparently, this is not intended by the Explanation. Howsoever wide the scope of Explanation 2(a) may be, its limits are implicit in it. It is only in a very gross case of inadequacy in inquiry or where inquiry is per se mandated on the basis of record available before the AO and such inquiry was not conducted, the revisional power so conferred can be exercised to invalidate the action of AO  Read the rest of this entry »

Case Law: Chandigarh Lawn Tennis Association vs. ITO (ITAT Chandigarh)

S.11: Entire law on what constitutes “advancement of objects of general public utility” so as to qualify as “charitable purpose” u/s 2(15) explained. Law also explained on the impact of carrying out incidental activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business in the course of actual carrying out of advancement of object of general public utility explained (All imp judgements referred)

To remove this anomaly, proper construction will be that the institution carrying out the object of advancement of general public utility which involve the incidental or ancillary activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business and generating income therefrom, the income to such an extent as is limited by the second proviso to section 2(15) of the Income Tax Act should be taken as exempt being treated as income from charitable purposes as per the relevant provisions of sections 2(15), section 10, section 11, section 12 or section 13, as the case may be and wherever applied. The other income which is not from the commercial activity, such as, by way of voluntary donations, contributions, grants or nominal registration fee etc. or otherwise will remain to be from charitable ITA No. 1382/Chd/2016- Chandigarh Lawn Tennis Association, Chandigarh 94 purposes and eligible for exemption under the relevant provisions. However, the income from activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business over the above limit prescribed from time to time as per the second proviso to section 2(15) of the Income Tax Act, should be treated as income from the business activity and liable to be included in the total income. In this way, the receipts of incidental business income while carrying out the objects of advancement of general public utility, when these cross the limit prescribed u/s 2(15) of the Act, will not render such institute as non-charitable bringing into taxation its entire income including non-business income or even income from charitable activity itself including voluntary contributions and donations. Only the business income which will be over and above the prescribed limit will be subjected to taxation Read the rest of this entry »

Case Law: CIT vs. Aquatic Remedies Pvt. Ltd (Bombay High Court)

S.148/ 151: If the AO reopens the assessment by obtaining the sanction of the Commissioner of Income Tax instead of the Additional Commissioner of Income Tax, there is a breach of section 151 which renders the reopening void

It is undisputed position before us that in terms of Section 151(2) of the Act, the sanctioning/ permission to issue notice under Section 148 of the Act has to be issued by the Additional Commissioner of Income Tax. We find that the Assessing Officer had not sought the approval of the Designated Officer but of the Commissioner of Income Tax. This is clear from the Form used to obtain the sanction. In any case, the approval/ satisfaction recorded in the form submitted for sanction of the Commissioner of Income Tax by the Assessing Officer reproduced herein above, it is clear that the Additional Commissioner of Income Tax had not granted permission to initiate reopening proceedings against the Respondent Assessee Read the rest of this entry »

Case Law: Commissioner of Customs vs. Dilip Kumar (Supreme Court) (Constitution Bench)

Entire law on interpretation of statues relating to ‘purposive interpretation’, ‘strict interpretation’, ‘literal interpretation’, etc explained. Difference in interpretation of statutes vs. exemption notifications explained. Q whether there is doubt or ambiguity in interpretation of a statute or notification benefit of doubt should go to the taxpayer or to the revenue explained. Law on Doctrine of substantial compliance and “intended use” also explained

Literally exemption is freedom from liability, tax or duty. Fiscally, it may assume varying shapes, specially, in a growing economy. For instance tax holiday to new units, concessional rate of tax to goods or persons for limited period or with the specific objective etc. That is why its construction, unlike charging provision, has to be tested on different touchstone. In fact, an exemption provision is like an exception and on normal principle of construction or interpretation of statutes it is construed strictly either because of legislative intention or on economic justification of inequitable burden or progressive approach of fiscal provisions intended to augment State revenue. But once exception or exemption becomes applicable no rule or principles requires it to be construed strictly. Truly speaking liberal and strict construction of an exemption provision are to be invoked at different stages of interpreting it. When the question is whether a subject falls in the notification or in the exemption clause then it being in nature of exception is to be construed strictly and against the subject, but once ambiguity or doubt about applicability is lifted and the subject falls in the notification then full play should be given to it and it calls for a wider and liberal construction Read the rest of this entry »

Case Law: Tema Exchangers Manufactures Pvt. Ltd vs. ACIT (Bombay High Court)

S.80-IA: There is a difference between “derived from the undertaking” and “derived from the business of the undertaking”. The latter expression is wider than the former. Interest on fixed deposits from Bank and other interest are “derived from the business of the undertaking” and are eligible for deduction u/s 80-IA

Mr. Subramaniam, learned Counsel appearing in support of the appeal points out that Pandian Chemicals Ltd. (supra) was rendered in the context of Section 80HH of the Act and we are concerned with Section 80IA of the Act. It is particularly pointed out that there is a difference in the wording of the two sections as existing during the previous year relevant to the subject assessment year. Section 80HH of the Act grants deduction in respect of the profits and gains derived from industrial undertaking while Section 80IA of the Act as in force at the relevant time grants deduction of profits and gains derived from any business of an industrial undertaking. It is submitted that the above issue is no longer res integra as the issue stand concluded in its favour by the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Jagdishprasad M. Joshi, 318 ITR 420  Read the rest of this entry »

Case Law: Sunrise Academy of Medical Specialities (India) (P.) Ltd vs. ITO (Kerala High Court) (DB)

S.56(2)(viib) vs. s. 68: Any premium received by a Company, in which the public does not have substantial interest, on sale of shares, in excess of its face value, can be treated as income from other sources u/s 56(2)(viib). This is not controlled by s. 68 which provides that if the assessee does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the credit, the amount can be assessed as income. If S. 68 is applicable, and the proviso is not satisfied, then the entire amounts credited to the books would be treated as income. If satisfactory explanation is offered as to the source, then the premium paid as revealed from the books will be brought to tax as income from other sources

Any premium received by a Company on sale of shares, in excess of its face value; if the Company is not one in which the public has substantial interest, would be treated as income from other sources, as seen from Section 56(2) (viib) of the Act, which we do not think can be controlled by the provisions of Section 68 of the Act. Section 68 on the other hand, as substituted with the provisos, treats any credit in the books of accounts, even by way of allotment of shares; for which no satisfactory explanation is offered, to be liable to income-tax. Clause (viib) of Section 56(2) is triggered at the stage of computation of income itself when the share application money received, from a resident, by a Company, in which the public are not substantially interested; is above the face value. Then the aggregate consideration received for the shares as exceeds the fair market value will be included as income from other sources. However, when the resident investor is not able to explain the nature and source for the credit seen in the books of accounts of the Company or the explanation offered is not satisfactory then the entire credit would be charged to income tax for that previous year  Read the rest of this entry »